In preparation for the Lincoln Laboratory's of a catastrophic launch pad accident to evaluate LES 8/9 space mission, a series of ti-ats was pertheir capability to contain the PuO 2 fuel. This formed to evaluate the nuclear safety capability of sequence of environments was to have consisted of the Multi-Hundred Watt (MHW) Radioisotope Therthe blast overpressure and fragments, followed by moelectric Generator (RTG) to be used to supply pow-the fireball, low velocity impact on the launch pad, er for the satellite. One such safety test is Test No. and solid propellant fire. The blast overpressure S-6, Launch Pad Abort Sequential Test. The objecand fragments were subsequently eliminated from tive of this test was to subject the RTG and its comthis sequence.
This report describes the procedures and presents the results of Phase II of Test S-6, Solid Propellant Fire. In this phase of the test, a simulant Fuel Sphere Assembly (FSA) and a mockup of a damaged Heat Source Assembly (HSA) were subjected to single proximity solid propellant fires of approximately 10-min duration. Steel was introduced into both tests to simulate the effects of launch pad debris and the solid rocket motor (SRM) casing that might be present in the fire zone.
The rationale for using these two test specimens is based on the results of Phase I of Test S-6, Low Velocity HSA Impact. 1 In that test, a simulant HSA was impacted on a concrete pad at approximately 30 m/s (=*100fps). As a result of that impact, the HSA was badly damaged.with two FSA's being released. However, all of the Graphite Impact Shells (GIS's) were intact. It was, therefore, concluded that the most likely contact with burning solid propellant would be by an intact FSA rolling away from the HSA impact or the HSA itself impacting next to a piece of burning propellant. The fact that the HSA impact was almost inelastic would indicate that it is highly unlikely that either the HSA or one of the FSA's would ever end up on top of a piece of burning propellant. The small amount of dispersion observed in Phase I would tend to suggest that the double proximity is also very unlikely. Therefore, it was decided that the fire tests would be of the single proximity type with a 0. 914-m (3-ft) cube of solid propellant, simulating the full web thickness of a SRM, and involve an intact simulant FSA and a damaged HSA.
0 TEST DESCRIPTION 2.1 Propellant
The solid propellant used was UTP-3001 which is u&ed in the SRM boosters of the Titan III C vehicle on which the LES 8/9 spacecraft will be launched. UTP-3001 contains powdered aluminum and ammonium perchlorate dispersed in a rubber binder. Several other additives are present in small percentages. The propellant blocks were inhibited so as to burn only on one face to give the maximum burning time. The 0. 9m (3-ft) dimension corresponds to the web thickness of the Titan III C SRM's. The rationale is that a piece of an actual motor could not burn any longer than the time neeessary to burn through a full web thickness. The steel plate was added to the test because the actual SRM's havea steel casing and it is thought by some that a rocket abort or destruct could not produce 
Test
Setup. The HSA fire test was setup at the LASL K-Site facility. A sand pad, similar to that described above for the FSA fire test, was constructed in the same location. A 0. 9-m (3-ft) cube of UTP-3001 solid rocket propellant was placed near the center of the pad with one inhibited surface down, go that the uninhibited surface was vertical and facing the northwest. A piece of 9. 5-mm (3/8-in.) thick steal plate was placed on top of the propellant block, as before.
An oven was designed and built at LASL to fit over the specimen and to preheat it to about 1040*C. The oven, shown in Pig. 2.10, contained four heater elements and was designed so that when the specimen was sitting on an insulated pad, it would be located near the center of these four heater elements. The oven was also equipped to maintain an inert atmosphere in the oven cavity during the preheat cycle. The oven was mounted on a stand, which can also be seen in Figs--10 and 2.11, so that it could be raised from ths specimen and then pulled away,together with the stand, to a safe distance from the propellant prior to ignition. The cable used for this operation can be seen in the foreground of Fig. 2.10. Another cable, which can be seen streched between the base of the proj-sUant block and the oven in Fig. 2.11 , was threaded under the propellant and used to pull the specimen to within a few centimeters of the uninhibited surface. This cable was attached to the base of the HSA mock-up by a thin stainless steel band.
A tungsten^rhenium thermocouple in a protective graphite tube was placed in the sand at the base of the propellant so that the recording end of the thermocouple would be very near the burning surface at ignition. The graphite tube was also equipped with an inlet to allow the cavity in the tube to be purged with argon just prior to ignition. A strip chart recorder was connected to the thermocouple so that the temperature could be recorded continuously during the burn. On the morning of the test, the propellant cube, steel plate, preheat oven, and test specimen were all in place. At 8:00 A, M., the preheat oven power was turned on and the preheat cycle started. At 9:00 A. M-, the oven temperature had reached 1030°C (1900°F), but the PICS temperature was only 750°C a382°F).
While the preheat continued, the tungstenrhenium thermocouple was placed at the base of the uninhibited surface of ths propellant block and connected to the recorder. A flow of argon to the protective graphite tube was established at that time, and allowed to continue until a few minutes before the test. Shortly after the test, the area was monitored for thoria and none was found. Later, aTter sufficient time for the sand and specimen to cool, the specimen was photographed, examined visually, and removed to CMB-5 for a posttest examination and additional photography.
3.4 Results. The burn lasted about 8 min from the time of ignition until the propellant was exhausted. This was on the order of 1 min shorter than the total burn time of the previous test with a a cube of solid propellant having the same dimensions.
This reduction in total burn time was most likely caused by the strong winds out of the northwest that blew onto the burning surface. With the wind from that direction, the flames tended to be whipped around the back of the propellant and probably melted the inhibitor off the back and sides of the cube, thus allowing the back sides to be ignited and burn toward the center of the remaining pieces of propellant. The intensity of the fire and the density of the column of smoke can be seen in the photograph in Fig. 2 .12. This photograph was taken from north of the burn pad and indicates the effect of the winds on the smoke column and any particles that it might be carrying.
Monitoring of the area surrounding the burn pad immediately after the test revealed no trace of thoria contamination, but traces of thoria were detected on the surfaces of the GIS's that contained unclad thoria simulant fuel spheres. Some 5 to 10 min after the completion of the burn the center of the 8-pack down between the FSA's could be seen to be still glowing white hot. That condition persisted for some time and probably accounted for a large fraction of the total ablation that was noted on the GIS's after they were removed from the 8-pack. The remains of the HSA mock-up can be seen, about half covered with the remains of the steel plate, in Fig. 2.13 . The disk-ehaped object to the right and leaning against the HSA is the remains of the end crush-up material that was placed on top of the 8-pack. This disk was probably knocked off when the steel plate fell on the specimen late in the burn. On close inspection, it was noted that both of the panels of the Ir outer clad nearest the burning propellant had been almost completely consumed. Only the thicker ring, on which the lifting lugs are mounted, was left intact on that side of the HSA. The graphite retaining ring of the 8-pack had been almost burned through, but still retained all eight FSA's. The eight GIS's seemed to be ablated more severely than were those in the FSA test, but most of the ablation seemed to be confined to those portions of the GIS's; that were nearest the center of the 8-pack. When the HSA and sand of the burn pad had cooled sufficiently, the HSA remains were removed to CMB-5 for further photography and posttest examinations.
The tungsten-rhenium thermocouple with its graphite housing survived the fire with no apparent damage. Unfortunately, the power to the Both of these panels, as can be seen in Fig. 3 .11, were almost completely consumed during the test. The GIS's showed some signs of ablation in addition to the solution by the molten steel, but all were intact when removed from the HSA mock-up. Of the four FSA's with Ir PICS, only the three nearest the fire were examined as part of the posttest analysis. The other, which was used only as a thermometer for the preheat cycle, was away from the fire and was in a less severe environment.
As is evident in
MHT-44. containing an Engelhardt Type III lr PICS, was in the bottom layer nearest the burning propellant as indicated in Pig. 2-8. This FSA was among the most severely damaged of those used in the HSA for the Phase I impact test. Most of the damage to the GIS seen in Fig. 3 .13 was sustained in the Phase I test and not in the solid propellant fire test. Nevertheless, as battered, as it was, the GIS could be easily opened by unscrewing the cap. The GIS and PISA are shown in Fig. 3 .14. It was evident from the inside of the GIS and the surface of the PICS that only a small amount of impurities entered the GIS through the threaded joint at the cap and reacted with the Ir of the PICS. A close-up of the PICS, Fig. 3 .15, shows that this reaction was confined to the outer layer of the surface.
MHT-37, containing an Engelhardt Type II Ir PICS, was in the top layer of FSA's as indicated in Fig. 2. 8 . This GIS showed some signs of ablation which can be seen in Fig. 3 .16, but it also could be easily opened by unscrewing the threaded cap. As with MHT-44, the main damage to the PICS was the small amount of materials entering the GIS through the threaded joint of the cap and depositing on the PICS, as shown in Fig. 3 .17. The close-up of this PICS, Fig. 3 .18, shows an overall deposition pattern that suggests that the fire products also entered the GIS through its inherent porosity. However, as was the case of MHT-44, these reactions were confined to the outer surface of the Ir and in no way appeared to reduce its ability to contain the fuel sphere.
MHT-57, containing an ORNL Type WC Ir PICS, was in the top layer next to MHT-37, as indicated in Fig. 2. 3 . As was the case for MHT-44, the major damage to the GIS occurred in the Phase I test. However, this GIS did show signs of ablation and some effect of the solution by molten steel, as shown in Fig. 3,19 . The effects on the PISA, however, were similar to the other two cases described above. Photographs of the GIS and PISA are given in Figs. 3.20 and 3 .21.
Since the damage to the PICS in this test was so much less than that to the PICS in the single PSA test, no metallographic sections of these PICS were removed for further analysis. However, sections were taken from the Ir outer clad and are shown, mounted for examination, in Fig. 3 . 22. Indicated on this photograph are the three areas that were examined carefully and are shown enlarged in Figs. 3. 23. 3. 24, and 3. 25. In all three areas, considerable amounts of Fe, Si, and Al were found alloyed with the Ir, In all the areas examined, no evidence was found to indicate that any of the Ir melted without being alloyed with one of these impurities. However, melting of pure iridium cannot be completely ruled out, even though it was not observed. Future tests involving solid propellant burning temperature and heat flux measurements should help to determine whether or not melting of pure iridium could have taken place in such a fire environment.
DISCUSSION
The results of the FSA fire test indicate that as long as the GIS is intact, it affords considerable protection for the PISA in a single proximity solid propellant fire environment. For one thing, the GIS seems to provide an effective thermal shield for the iridium PICS. Evidently, the temperature at the surface of a PICS in an FSA is considerably lower than that at the outer surface of the GIS. The temperature of the PICS of an FSA, placed in the fire with the test specimen, was measured during this test, as described above. Although the thermocouple failed before the completion of the test, it did indicate that the maximum temperature of the PICS of an FSA. introduced to the fire without being preheated, would probably not exceed ~ 1650 °C (3000°*?). This is in good agreement with the maximum PICS temperature predicted in a calculation q by Coroi of APL. Of course, neither that calculation nor this measurement took into account the effect of the thermal source of a "live" fuel sphere.
Probably of more importance, the GIS seems to be relatively effective in isolating the iridium of the PICS from the impurities of the fire environment, especially the iron from steel that might be in the area. The degree of solution of the graphite of the GIS by molten steel that occurred in this test "/as not enough to breach the GIS, nor did it have any adverse effects on the iridium of the PICS. However, appreciable amounts of molten steel did not come into intimate contact with the GIS until some time into the test. It is, therefore, not obvious that intimate contact with steel from the beginning of the fire test might not result in the GIS being breached. Such a failure of the GIS would probably result in a significant reaction between the iridium PICS and molten steel, conceivably causing the PICS itself to be breached.
The conditions of the FSA's after the HSA fire test were not surprising, considering the results of the single FSA test. There was slightly more ablation of the GIS's, but most of this probably occurred after the propellant was exhausted, while the center of the HSA 8-pack continued to burn for several minutes. Of course, in a live HSA the burning would continue longer and the ablation would be greater because of the fuel's heat input. The main damage to the HSA was that sustained by the iridium panels of the outer clad. The amount of alloying and subsequent melting that occurred to the two "front" panels suggests that an unprotected PISA might suffer similar damage and be seriously breached as a result ot such a solid propellant fire environment. However, since all of the PISA's remained contained within their GIS's during the low velocity impact tests, the effect of the fire environment on a bare PISA was not considered as a part of this LES 8/9 test. 5.0 CONCLUSIONS Based on the results of these tests and the posttest analyses, the following conclusions can be reached;
1. The PICS of FSA's contained within a damaged HSA would not be breached nor seriously affected by the environment encountered in a single proximity solid propellant fire of up to eight minute duration.
2. Part of the outer iridium clad of a damaged HSA would be consumed in a single proximity solid propellant fire, but the ability of the HSA to contain the FSA's would not be seriously degraded.
3. An FSA with the GIS intact would survive a nine minute single proximity solid propellant fire without the PICS being breached or seriously damaged.
4. An FSA, either by itself or contained within a damaged HSA,should not be seriously affected by the presence of excess iron (such as that afforded by the steel casing of the SRM) in an environment of a single proximity solid propellant fire, provided that the GIS remains intact. 
